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COMBAT DAMAGE ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE (CDAC) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Unaer the technical direction of the Combat Damage Assess-
ment Committee (CDAC) , the Combat Damage Assessment Team (CDAT)
conducted firings of the A-10/GAU-b weapon system against an array
of 10 tanks simulating a Soviet tank company deployed for an
attack. The CDAT used M-47 tanks stowed with main gun ammunition,
diesel fuel, lubricating oil, and crew manikins to simulate the
Soviet tanks. The pilot of tne A-lu aircraft used in the firings
conducted firings at low altitudes and low dive angles which simu-
lated attack below the altitude of effective engagement for
opposing air defense networks employing acquisition and fire con-
trol radar. The purpose of the test was to evaluate the effects
of the Aerojet 3umm API anti-tank ammunition (lot Numoer AJD
79A181-001) of the GAU-b gun under challenging conditions of
engagement for the A-10/GAU-6 system against realistically simu-
lated Soviet main battle tanks.
The CDAC assessed the results of the low angle cannon firings
of the A-lu aircraft against the simulated Soviet tank company as
follows
:
1. Attack Parameters ; The pilot of the A-lu aircraft
attacked the simulated Soviet tank company for 19 minutes b4
seconds at low altitude and dive angles. The GAU-3 cannon has a
ground selectable nominal fire rate of either 4200 rounds per
minute or 2100 rounds per minute. The system was set to fire at
the 4200 round per minute rate during this test. The pilot made a
total of eight passes, each at a primary target tank. The passes
resulted in projectile impacts on eight primary target tanks. The
attack open-fire dive angles averaged four degrees for the eight
passes against the targets. Open-fire slant ranges averaged 2791
feet. The pilot fired 484 rounds in eight bursts averaging 6u.5
rouncs and 0.88 seconds each.
2. Weapons Effects : The A-10/GAU-6 weapon system achieve^
143 impacts on tne array of target tanks. The ratio of direct
impacts to total rounds fired was 0.20. Ricochet hits are also
capable of causing damage. If the ricochet hits which can cause
damage are added to the direct impacts, the overall ratio of
impacts to rounds fired becomes 0.30. The weapon system achieved
13 perforations of the armored envelopes of the tanks with a ratio
of perforations to total impacts of 0.09. The ratio of perfora-
tions to direct impacts was 0.13. Many projectiles, which did not
perforate armor, severely damaged exterior track and suspension
components of the tanks.
3. Damage Assessment : Two tanks were immobilized and
silenced. One tank was immobilized and seriously degraded in fire-
power. One tank was immobilized. One tank was silenced and seri-
ously degraded in mobility. Two tanks were not attacked and three
others, though impacted or perforated, were not damaged sufficient-
ly to degrade either mobility or firepower. The simulated Soviet
tank company's overall combat capability was diminished by b0%.
4. Test Conditions : The target tanks were sited in open,
flat desert terrain with no cover and little concealment. Aerial
weather conditions were ones of unlimited ceiling and visibility.
Shortly after the initial firing, clouds of white dust from pro-
jectile impacts were evident. Such conditions effectively simu-
lated the actual obscuration which would have been presented to
the pilots in combat.
5. Results ; The overall results of the test are summarized
in Table I. Appendix A contains graphical and summary information
for this firing and Appendix B contains definitions of the terms
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Since February, 1978, the Armament Directorate, A-10 System
Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, has con-
ducted firing tests using the A-10/GAU-8 system in low-level,
air-to-ground engagements of armored targets. The tests have been
conducted within the framework of the GAU-8 30mm ammunition Lot
Acceptance Verification Program (LAVP) - Airborne. The LAVP has
the following objectives which apply to the present tests:
A. To evaluate the performance of existing production lots
of GAU-8 ammunition when fired from the air under opera-
tional conditions.
B. To evaluate the lethality of GAU-8 ammunition against
armored targets when fired at low level from A-10 air-
craft using operational tactics.
To conduct the LAVP program, the Armament Directorate has
cooperated with Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, Langley AF3
,
Virginia and, in turn, with the Tactical Fighter Weapons Center,
Nellis AFB , Nevada. Within the framework of that cooperation, the
Armament Directorate has set up a Combat Damage Assessment Tear
(CDAT) to plan and execute the firing tests and evaluate the
results. The CDAT functions under the direction of a Combat
Damage Assessment Committee (CDAC) which has prepared this report
of the firing test of 30 August, 1979.
TEST PHILOSOPHY
To generate realistic data, the CDAC determined to use a
highly empirical technique of destructive testing of actual tank
targets. Tests have involved firings at individual tanks in
November, 1977 and February - March, 1978, and, more recently,
arrays of tanks in tactical formations. The experimental setup
for the firings of 30 August, 1979 involved the use of a multi-
target, tactically arrayed tank formation for attack by the
A-10/GAU-8 system. The CDAT elected to simulate a Soviet tank
company, as organized within a tank division, as the target array
for two attacking A-10 aircraft. As few constraints as possible
were placed on the attacking pilots in an attempt to develop as
much realism as possible. Table II shows the test factors which
would have been ideal in the test of 30 August, 1979 and the
practicable setup which was achieved.
Table II. Comparison of Ideal and Practical Test Situations
Ideal
Test Parame ters
1. Air Attack Real ism
a. Actual A-10/GAU-8
b. 30mm API




e. Low altitude attack
angle (< 6 degrees)
2. Ai r Defense Real ism
a. Automatic cannon
f i r ing at a i rcraf t
b. Missile systems firing
at a i rcraf t
c. Small arms firing at
ai re raft
d. AD suppression by
ai re raft
3. Threa t Targets and Doctrine
a. T62/T64/T72 high
fidelity ta rgets
b. Stowed combat loads
(in T62/T64/T72)








1. Ai r Attac k Realism
a. Actual A-10/GAU-8
b. 30mm API
c. Nevada weather £
desert terrain
d. Average open-fire
range : 2791 feet
.
e. Low altitude attack
angle (< f> degrees)





































on s imula t ion
3. Threat Ta rgets and Poet rine
a. Simulated Soviet tanks
b. Stowed combat loads
(in US m-47)
c. Wooden crew manikins
d. Static combat formation
e. Stationary targets
SIMULATED GROUND COMBAT SITUATION
The firing test of 30 August, 1979 simulated the attack by
two A-10 aircraft on a Soviet tank company. The CDAC hypothesized
the Soviet tank company to be the lead march security detachment
for its battalion, which in turn, is the advance guard of a larger
mobile formation. The lead detachment operates approximately five
kilometers in front of the Soviet battalion column. The mission
of the advance company is to ensure the uninterrupted advance of
the battalion and provide security against attack. Upon meeting
heavy resistance, the company deploys into an appropriate combat
formation to reduce the resistance, or form a base of fire for
offensive action by the remainder of the battalion.
A Soviet tank company, which is simulated in the firing test,
would probably have other units attached to it for its support.
Attached units might include any one or all of the following
elements: (1) motorized rifle platoon; (2) engineer detachment;
(3) chemical defense specialists; (4) 122mm howitzer battery; (5)
air defense element. The lead detachment simulated in the firing
test consisted of tanks alone. The pure tank formation was
arranged with two platoons up and one back, simulating an assault
posture. The tanks used in the firing test were US M-47 tanks,
largely intact, containing crew manikins, and stowed with ammuni-
tion, fuel, and oil. The tanks were not maneuvered during the
firing test and the formation remained essentially a snapshot of
the company at a single point in time.
TARGET TANKS
The most effective tanks available in sufficient numbers to
simulate Soviet T-55 and T-62 (Figure 1) tanks were the US M-47
tanks. Both of the Soviet tank models are similar in armor protec-
tion to the M-47. With the appropriate purging of the gasoline
fuel system of the US tanks, the CDAT managed to field a tank simi-
lar in survivability to the T-55 and T-62 tanks from the viewpoint
of ignitable internal material. Few data are available on the
Soviet T-64 and later model tanks from the viewpoints of armor pro-
tection and the arrangement of internal material. The decision
was made, accordingly, to simulate the earlier model Soviet tanks
with the readily available US tanks.
The M-47 tanks used for targets were in excellent condition
from the viewpoint of damage assessment. The exterior components
were complete and the tanks have proven to be effective targets
for the collection of exterior mobility damage. Interior compo-
nents were less complete in the target tanks. All of the most
essential items were present, e.g., main gun, engine, transmis-
sion, fuel tanks, ammunition racks, etc., but other items such as
oil coolers, range finders, vision devices, and radios, have not
been present in all tanks.
The most sensitive internal items from the viewpoint of cata-
strophic kills and high percentage Mobility (M) and Firepower (F)
kills are the following, which were placed in the test tanks as
noted
:
Generic Sensitive Item Test Item
1. Ammunition US Cartridge, 90-mm TP-T
2. Fuel Number 2 Diesel
3. Oil Oil in Engine, Transmission
and Drive Components.
4. Personnel Articulated Plywood
Manikins
The tanks were static during the test and their engines were
not running, with the result that the fuel and oil were much cool-
er and more inert than would have been the case with a moving tank
or a static vehicle with its engine running. The kill ratio
achieved in the firing test of 30 August, 1979, therefore, is prob-
ably conservative from the viewpoint of fires resulting from ignit-
ed fuel and oil.
TEST PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS
Conduct of the test consisted of bringing together the ammuni
tion
,
gun, aircraft, pilots, and combat arrayed and loaded tanks
into a several minutes simulation of combat. In essence, the
^•pr? v qp ir=.:?
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FIGURE 1. Russian T62 Medium Tank
decisive elements which were fed into the test immediately prior
to the firing were the following:
1. Aerojet 30mm API ammunition, Lot Number AJD 79A181-001.
2. General Electric GAU-8 Gatling gun.
3. Fairchild Republic A-10 attack aircraft.
4. USAF Fighter Pilots.
5. US Designed M-47 main battle tanks.
The combat simulation itself comprised the aerial fire and
maneuver of the attacking A-10 aircraft. A realistic way of pre-
senting the combat simulation is to outline the sequence of perti-
nent events in each firing pass. These events and the pertinent
data which the CDAT attempted to collect, in order to reconstruct
the simulated combat firing of 30 August, 1979, were as follows:
Sequence Event Data
1. Aircraft Approach Speed, Altitude
2. Aircraft Attack Open-fire Range, Dive Angle
3. Aircraft Attack Burst Time, Rounds Fired
4. Aircraft Attack Cease-fire Range, Dive Angle
5. Gun Effects, (Accuracy) Impacts on Tanks
6. Gun Effects, (Lethality) Perforations through Armor
7. Tank Damage Catastrophic (K-Kill)
,
Mobility (M-Kill) , and
Firepower (F-Kill) Kills
The data noted immediately above were collected through the
combined efforts of the CDAT and range support personnel at Nellis
AFB, working together and using TSPI equipment, motion picture and
still cameras, the industrial efforts required to repair, refur-
bish, and field the tank targets, and various systematic research
techniques used to describe weapon effects and combat damage. The
most basic materiel used in the test; i.e., the aircraft, gun, and
projectile are illustrated in Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5. The tanks
were arrayed in the tactical formation of a Soviet tank company as
shown in Figure 6.
The pilots making the attack flew from the base area in a two-
ship, mutually supporting element and employed operational tactics
immediately before and during the firing passes. The pilots
approached the target area at low altitude and simulated target
acquisition with the help of a forward air controller. Upon
arrival in the target area, the pilots noted that one aircraft had
not been loaded with ammunition. The CDAT decided to conduct the
test with the single loaded aircraft. The pilot proceeded to at-
tack the acquired targets at low altitudes and dive angles, simu-
lating operation below the altitudes for effective acquisition
and engagement by opposing air defense missile and gun systems.
The pilot with the unloaded aircraft made several diversionary
passes in support of the firing aircraft.
FIGURE 2. U.S.A.F./Fairchild Republic A-10 Aircraft.
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The damage assessment conducted by the CDAT is pre-
sented on the following pages. The attacking aircraft was
loaded with enough ammunition for the originally postula-
ted attack on five tanks and did not have enough ammuni-
tion to attack all 10 tanks in the company array. Conse-
quently, tanks 33 and 31 were not attacked or impacted,
and are not discussed further. Appendix A, following the
damage assessment section contains graphical and tabular
information relative to the mission in general , for
example, aircraft attack parameters, weapon effects, and
summaries of damage.
Terms used in the damage assessment summaries are
defined in Appendix B.
Impacts on tanks were arbitrarily numbered for identi-
fication purposes. The impacts were numbered sequenti-
ally, first at the turret level, then at the hull level.
If additional impacts were discovered during the combat
damage assessment (as was sometimes the case) they were
given the next sequential number, i.e. , no attempt was
made to "correct" the sequence. THE READER IS CAUTIONED
THAT THIS NUMBERING SYSTEM HAS NO RELATIONSHIP WHATSOEVER
TO THE ARRIVAL SEQUENCE OF PROJECTILES ON THE TANK OR TO
THE PORTION OF THE BURST IMPACTING THE TANK.
15
TARGET TANK DAMAGE SUMMARY




The target tank was impacted at an attack aspect
of 211 degrees (left rear) during one firing pass at
low atitude and low dive angle. The A-10 expended
47 rounds in the firing pass.
2. Kill Assessment :
100% M-Kill and 95% F-Kill resulting from the
following observed projectile effects (Figure 7 and
8):
a. Perforations : 2
b. Significant Impacts : 6
c. Insignificant Impacts: 2_3
TOTAL IMPACTS : 31
3. Rationale for Kill Assessment :
a. M-Kill: The assessment of 100% M-Kill was based
on impact 29 which penetrated the left track adjus-
ting idler hub, cumulative damage to the track and
suspension system from impacts 12, 14, 24, 25, and
28 , and impacts 3 and 5 which perforated the left
turret and caused casualties to the commander,
gunner, and loader.
b. F-Kill: The assessment of F-Kill was based on the









































O " Ricochet Off Ground
FIGURE 8. Tank 41, Impact Diagram, Rear
18
TARGET TANK DAMAGE SUMMARY
M-47 Tank Number 38
Description :
The target tank was impacted at an attack aspect
of 210 degrees (left rear) during one firing pass in
which the attacking aircraft expended 62 rounds.
Kill Assessment ;
100% M-Kill based on the following observed









3. Rationale for Kill Assessment ;
100% M-Kill based on impact 7 which perforated the
rear of the hull (see Figure 12) and penetrated into the
transmission case; impact 10, which penetrated into the
right final drive; and cumulative damage to the track and
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Note impacts 7 and 10 which perforated the hull
and the right final drive casting respectively
and contributed to the assessment of 100% M-Kill
FIGURE 12. Tank 38, Photo, Rear.
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TARGET TANK DAMAGE SUMMARY




The target tank was impacted at an attack aspect
of 141 degrees (right rear) during one firing pass in
which the attacking aircraft expended 85 rounds.
2. Kill Assessment ;
95% M-Kill and 100% F-Kill resulting from the








3. Rationale for Kill Assessment :
a. M-Kill: A 95% M-Kill was assessed based on
impacts 1, 3, and 4 which perforated the right turret
causing casualties to the commander
,
gunner , and
loader degrading mobility (90%) and on cumulative
damage (5%) to the track and suspension system by
impacts 13, 14, 17, 18, and 22.
b. F-Kill: A 100% F-Kill was assessed based on
impact 4 which perforated the turret ring and jammed
the turret so that it would not traverse, and on the
commander, gunner, and loader casualties inflicted by
impacts 1 and 3. Impact 24, which penetrated the bore







































O - Ricochet Oil Ground
FIGURE 14. Tank 35, Impact Diagram, Front and Rear
26
TARGET TANK DAMAGE SUMMARY
M-47 Tank Number 34
Description ;
The target tank was impacted at an attack aspect
of 165 degrees (right rear) during one firing pass in
which the attacking aircraft expended 70 rounds.
Kill Assessment ;
No degradation in mobility or fire-power.
a. Perforations
b. Significant Impacts
c. Insignificant Impacts 1
TOTAL IMPACTS
Rationale for Kill Assessment:
The single impact on tank 34 partially penetrated






































TARGET TANK DAMAGE SUMMARY
M-47 Tank Number 29
Description :
The target tank was impacted at an attack aspect
of 215 degrees (left rear) during one firing pass in
which the attacking aircraft expended 53 rounds.
Kill Assessment ;
No degradation in mobility or fire-power.
a. Perforations
b. Significant Impacts
c. Insignificant Impacts s
TOTAL IMPACTS
Rationale for Kill Assessment:
None of the impacts on tank 29 (Figure 16) contri
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FIGURE 16. Tank 29, Impact Diagram.
30
TARGET TANK DAMAGE SUMMARY
M-47 Tank Number 27
Description :
The target tank was impacted at an attack aspect
of 220 degrees (left rear) during one firing pass in
which the attacking aircraft expended 35 rounds.
Kill Assessment :







Rationale for Kill Assessment:
All of the impacts on the target were ricochets
off the ground. Impact 3 (Figure 17) perforated the
rear hull armor but did not possess enough residual
energy to penetrate into the transmission case. The
remaining five projectiles impacted the track and
suspension system, hull, and turret with no harmful
effects on nobility or firepower.
31
Legend
Note: Perforation resulted from
richoche t off ground
^ - Perforation
- Hit
O " Ricochet Ott Ground
FIGURE 17. Tank 27, Impact Diagram, Rear
32
TARGET TANK DAMAGE SUMMARY
M-47 TANK NUMBER 4
Description :
The target tank was impacted at an attack aspect
of 145 degrees (right rear) during one firing pass in
which the attacking aircraft expended 62 rounds.
Kill Assessment :
100% M-Kill and 100% F-Kill resulting from the








Rationale for Kill Assessment :
a. M-Kill: The assessment of a 100% M-Kill is based
on impacts 15 and 16 (Figure 21) which perforated
the rear hull armor and penetrated into the engine
compartment, severing two oil cooler lines and
penetrating the transmission case; and on cumula-
tive damage to the track and suspension system
caused by impacts 19, 25, 28, 30, 31, and 32.
Crew casualties caused by impact 1 contributed to
the kill .
b. F-Kill: The assessment of a 100% F-Kill is based
on impact 3 which hit in the turret ring and
jammed the turret so that it would not traverse,
and on impact 1 (Figure 22) which perforated the
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FIGURE 20. Tank 4, Impact Diagram.
36
Note impacts 15




case and oil cooler
lines
.
FIGURE 21. Tank 4, Photo, Rear
37
Note fragmentation effects on commander and
loader manikins from impact 1.
FIGURE 22. Tank 4, Photo, Commander and Loader.
38
TARGET TANK DAMAGE SUMMARY
M-47 Tank Number 7
Description ;
The target tank was impacted at an attack aspect
of 163 degrees (right rear) during one firing pass in
which the attacking aircraft expended 70 rounds.
Kill Assessment :
100% M-Kill and 100% F-Kill resulting from the








Rationale for Kill Assessment ;
a. M-Kill: The assessment of a 100% M-Kill is based
on impacts 12 and 13 which perforated the rear of
the hull penetrating into the transmission case,
and on cumulative damage to the track and suspen-
sion system caused by impacts 14, 17, 18, 19, and
24.
b. F-Kill: The assessment of a 100% F-Kill is based
on impact 1, which perforated the right side of
the turret killing the gunner and damaging the
commander's main armament controls, and impact 2






































NOTE: Impacts 4,7,8,9, and 10 are not shown. These impacts
struck the top surface of the tank and resulted in
minor external damage.
legend
2 1 3 16
12 13 15 14
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FIGURE 25. Tank 7, Photo, Right Side.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
On jo August, iy'79 at Neilis AFB. Nevada, the Combat
Damage Assessment Team (CDAT) conductca firings of the
A-10/GAU-b weapon system against an array of io tanks simu-
lating a Soviet tank company aeployed for an attack. The
purpose of the firing test was to evaluate the effects of
Aerojet Lot Number AJD 79Albl-001 30mm API anti-tank ammu-
nition of tne GAU-b gun unaer challenging conditions of
engagement for the A-10/GAU-b system against realistically
Simula tea Soviet tank formations. The CDAT used M-47
tanks stowed with main gun ammunition, aiesel fuel, lubri-
cating oil, ana crew manikins to simulate the Soviet
tanks. Tne pilot of the A-lu aircraft used in the firings
conducted tne attack at low altitudes and low aive angles
which simulated attack below the altitude of the effective
engagement for opposing air defense systems using acquisi-
tion ana fire control raaar.
"The firing test can be summarizea in terms of tne
following data which were collected ana/or extracted from
the firings:
Aircraf t Par ameters
1. Speed (average) 523 ft/sec
2. Altitude 333 feet
3. Dive Angle (average) 4.1 oegrees
4. Open-fire Slant Range (average) 2791 feet
5. Burst Length/P-ounas (averages) 1.15 sec/60.5
o . Number Passes (primary) b
7. Target Aspects (predominantly) right rear,
left rear
Weapon Effects Target Damage
1. Rounas Fired 4o4 1. K-Kills
2. Impacts 143 2. M+F-Kills 2
3. Ricochets (off ground)-- 4b 3. M-Kills 2
4. Direct Impacts y7 4. F-Kills 1
5. Perforations 13 5. Light Gama--,e--3
o. Not attackea--2
These aata and the more detailed base from which they
were extracted can be arranged into measures of effective-
ness for the A-10/GAU-b system under conditions similar to
those in the firing test, i.e., empirical combat simula-
tion. The following values of effectiveness are based on










Direct Impacts _ 0,20
Rounds Fired
Perf orat ions = 0.13
Direct Impacts





The eight target tanks were attacked predominately
from the right rear, rear and left rear and suffered the
damage shown in Table I and Table A-l.
The data and measures summarized above, and the other
data contained in this report, support several
conclusions
:
1. The A-10/GAU-8 weapon system in realistic simula-
tion of combat is capable of inflicting M- and F-Kills on
M-47 and similarly protected main battle tanks, e.g.
Soviet T-55 and T-62 tanks.
2. The weapon system, in low level attacks, can per-
forate specifically the side and rear surfaces of the
hulls and turrets of M-47 and similarly protected main
battle tanks.
3. The weapon system is an effective killing agent
against the side and rear surfaces of M-47 and similar
tanks when firing moderate length bursts of 0.65 to 1.45
seconds containing 35 to 85 rounds.
4. From the viewpoint of GAU-8 30mm API ammunition
effects and resulting damage to combat stowed main battle
tanks, the tactic of low-level attack in this firing test
was shown to be a successful one.
44
APPENDIX A
Graphical and Summary Information
Table A-I contains a summary of the results of Mission
18 of 30 August, 1979. Table A-II contains a summary of
damage assessment based on perforation locations. Table
A-III contains a summary of aircraft attack parameters.
Figure A-l depicts aircraft attack aspect by tank number
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The terms used in this report are defined below:
IMPACT — Any evidence of a projectile strike against any
portion of the target. Ground ricochets striking the tar-
get were classified as "impacts".
PERFORATION -- Any rupture of the armored envelope caused
by an impacting projectile which results in a complete rup-
ture of an armored surface by the projectile or spall frag-
ments. A perforation can occur only when the armor is im-
pacted. The word "Perforation" was deliberately selected
to avoid the ambiquities which may occur through use of
the word "penetration". Behind-the-pla te effects may or
may not result from a perforation.
HIT -- Any impact not classified as a perforation.
MOBILITY KILL (M-KILL) — Loss of tactical mobility result-
ing from damage which cannot be repaired by the crew on
the battlefield. A tank is considered to have sustained a
100% M-Kill when it is no longer capable of executing con-
trolled movement on the battlefield. Mobility is DEGRADED
when a tank can no longer maintain position in its forma-
tion .
FIREPOWER KILL (F-KILL) — Loss of tactical firepower re-
sulting from damage which cannot be repaired by the crew
on the battlefield. A tank is considered to have sustain-
ed a 100% F-Kill when it is incapable of delivering con-
trolled fire from its main a rmament . Firepower is
DEGRADED when a tank can no longer maintain its "normal"
rate-of-f i re , velocity, accuracy, time to shift targets,
etc .
CATASTROPHIC KILL (K-KILL) — A tank is considered to have
sustained a K-Kill when both an M-Kill and a F-Kill have
occurred as the result of killing fires and explosions
from ignited fuel and/or ammunition. A tank which has suf-
fered a K-Kill is considered not to be economically repair-
able, and, by U.S. standards, would be abandoned on the
battlefield .
ATTACK ASPECT — The angle of approach of the aircraft
with respect to the orientation of the tank with zero
degrees representing the front of the tank (gun forward)
and 180 degrees representing the rear of the tank.
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SIGNIFICANT IMPACTS — Impacts which damage systems, compo-
their destruction ornents or sub-systems resulting in
partial loss of function. This type d
fho aecaccpH k T 1 1t e assessed ill.
amage contributes to
INSIGNIFICANT IMPACTS -- Impacts which damage non-critical
structural , convenience , or accessory components and which
may result in their destruction or partial loss of func-
tion, but with no impact on mobility or firepower consider-
ations. Good maintenance practices contemplate repair or
replacement of such items at the earliest opportunity con-
sistent with accomplishment of the mission.
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